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      <title>Technicalinfo.net Security</title>

      <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net</link>

      <description>Security thoughts and observations of Gunter Ollmann</description>

      <language>en-us</language>

      <lastBuildDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2009 21:00:00 EST</lastBuildDate>

      <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>

      <copyright>Copyright 2009, Gunter Ollmann</copyright>

      <item>

         <title>Botnet Communication Topologies</title>

         <description>A clear distinction between a bot agent and a common piece of malware lies within a bot’s ability to communicate with a Command-and-Control (CnC) infrastructure. CnC allows a bot agent to receive new instructions and malicious capabilities, as dictated by a remote criminal entity. This compromised host then can be used as an unwilling participant in Internet crime as soon as it is linked into a botnet via that same CnC.  The criminals actively controlling botnets must ensure that their CnC infrastructure is sufficiently robust to manage tens-of-thousands of globally scattered bot agents, as well as resist attempts to hijack or shutdown the botnet. Botnet operators have consequently developed a range of technologies and tactics to protect their CnC investment. This paper reviews the tactics commonly employed by botnet operators to maintain control of their botnets and the impact of these tactics on standard network-blocking protection stratagems.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/BotnetCommunicationTopologies.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2009 21:00:00 EST</pubDate>

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         <title>The Botnet vs. Malware Relationship</title>

         <description>A common misperception of cyber-crime botnets is that a one-to-one relationship exists between a malware bot agent and an individual botnet. Even if this had been a true statement back when botnets first began to appear, it is not true today. The key is the development of commercial build-it-yourself malware kits. These professional-grade tools lower the entry-level requirements for creating a malware bot agent, constructing a Command-and-Control (CnC) structure, and controlling the resultant botnet.  As a result, sophisticated botnets are well within the grasp of any technically-savvy user who knows how to use an Internet search engine and build a Web site. Enterprise organizations must change their focus from identifying malware by name to identifying the criminals behind individual botnets in order to keep up with this evolving threat.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/BotnetMalwareRelationship.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2009 21:00:00 EST</pubDate>

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      <item>

         <title>Anti-Fraud Image Solutions Whitepaper</title>

         <description>Many of today’s more successful Internet-based fraud tactics require the counterfeiting of popular transactional Web sites such as financial portals, stock-trading platforms and online retail sites. For the fraud to be successful, the cyber-criminal must typically clone most, if not all, of the targeted site’s content and host the counterfeit site on a Web server under their control. With some minor modifications to the underlying HTML code and changes to the application logic, the cyber-criminal will seek to steal the personal authentication or authorization credentials of unlucky victims who fall to the counterfeit site. Armed with these credentials, the cyber-criminal will subsequently attempt to defraud the accounts of their victim. This whitepaper provides an overview of the techniques available to organizations that wish to undertake such identification activities – evaluating the pro’s and con’s of the various mechanisms and providing advice on how to employ this class of investigative technology.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/AntiFraudImageSolutions.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2009 21:00:00 EST</pubDate>

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      <item>

         <title>Security Blogging and Damballa</title>

         <description>Gunter's changed jobs and now has a personal security blog that gets updated regularly!</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20090411_BloggingAndDamballa.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sun, 11 Apr 2009 08:00:00 EST</pubDate>

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         <title>Continuing Business with Malware Infected Customers Whitepaper</title>

         <description>The problem facing online businesses going forward is, if upwards of one-third of their customers are likely to be using computers infected with malware to conduct business transactions with them, how should they continue to do business with an infected customer base? This new whitepaper discusses many of the best practices businesses can adopt for their Web application design and back-office support processes in order to minimize the growing threat of man-in-the-browser malware, along with helping to reduce several of the risks posed with continuing to do business customers likely to be operating infected computers...</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20081102_MalwareInfectedCustomers.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sun, 02 Nov 2008 20:45:00 EST</pubDate>

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      <item>

         <title>SEO Code Injection Whitepaper</title>

         <description>Following several press interviews over the last couple of months, it was clear that many people don't quite grasp how the recent spate of SEO code injection attacks worked. Sure, they understand the concepts of the mass-defacements, but many people seem to think that it's the search engines fault.
In reality, it has very little to do with the search engine itself, it's all about the way the "smart" applications have tried to optimize their page content so they can get better page ranks in the resultant searches of potential customers. This Search Engine Optimization (SEO) can be abused fairly easily.
So, in order to help explain how the attack actually works, and propose some remediation/protection steps, I've created a new whitepaper on the subject - titled SEO Code Injection.         </description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20080831_SEOCodeInjection.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sat, 31 Aug 2008 16:00:01 EST</pubDate>

      </item>
      <item>

         <title>Back catalog of Blogs</title>

         <description>Newly added 2008 archive of Frequency-X postings by Gunter.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/ISS/2008/index.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 01:00:01 EST</pubDate>

      </item>
      <item>

         <title>Understanding the Web browser threat</title>

         <description>Examination of vulnerable online Web browser populations and the "insecurity iceberg". With 623 million users vulnerable to bugs in teh Web browser, what does this mean going forward for Internet security? </description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/UnderstandingTheWebBrowserThreat.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Tue, 01 JUL 2008 12:00:01 EST</pubDate>

      </item>
      <item>

         <title>Patching A Sick Health Care System</title>

         <description>After some time away, I'm back to writing for SC Magazine. This months article covers the problems in patching the embedded systems used in the heath care organizations.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20080423_HealthCarePatching.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Wed, 23 APR 2008 19:10:00 EST</pubDate>

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      <item>

         <title>2007 Vulnerability Disclosure Rates</title>

         <description>According to X-Force, there has been a 5.4 percent year-on-year decrease in the annual disclosure of new vulnerabilities. Why? In this blog entry I examine the probable influences in the decrease - decreasing vulnerability appeal, vendor security testing improvements, professional bug-hunters and vulnerability purchase programs...</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20080210_2007VulnerabilityCounts.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sun, 10 Feb 2008 17:50:00 EST</pubDate>

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      <item>

         <title>The Pharming Guide - Part 2</title>

         <description>The Pharming Guide provides detailed analysis of the pharming threat. This second part covers in detail the attack vectors used to conduct the attack and the protection elements needed to secure against the threat.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/Pharming2.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sun, 27 Jan 2008 19:00:00 EST</pubDate>

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      <item>

         <title>The Pharming Guide - Part (1)</title>

         <description>The Pharming Guide provides detailed analysis of the pharming threat. This first part covers the nature of the threat and a detailed analysis of how DNS actually works in the real world.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/Pharming.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2008 18:00:00 EST</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>

         <title>User-Agent Attacks</title>

         <description>How can you automatically 0wn a Web site the next time the administrator logs in? Through the User-Agent field of your Web browser of course! A fabulous example of second-order cross-site scripting.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20080121_UserAgentAttacks.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jan 2008 19:55:00 EST</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>

         <title>Hacking a Boeing 787?</title>

         <description>The FAA document entitled “Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Systems and Data Networks Security--Isolation or Protection From Unauthorized Passenger Domain Systems Access” raises the possibility of mile-high hacking a fly-by-wire, multi-million dollar, aircraft.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20080107_HackingBoeing787.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Mon, 7 Jan 2008 19:15:00 GMT</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>

         <title>WHOIS XSS</title>

         <description>There's been a little fuss over a recent posting concerning the threat of WHOIS cross-site scripting. To get your attention, it starts with “This is massive.” Now don’t get me wrong, there is a threat, but it is marginal – and I’ll explain why in a little bit. What’s all the fuss about?</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20080104_WhoisXSS.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Fri, 4 Jan 2008 08:45:00 GMT</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>

         <title>Hacking Barcodes</title>

         <description>"Barcode systems susceptible to serious hacker attacks" - so says Heise Security, in their article posted yesterday concerning FX's presentation at this weeks 24th Chaos Communication Congress. The article describes a few of the threats to systems that rely upon barcodes (on and two dimensional) - in particular their ease of manipulation for scamming purposes and the possibilities for code injection attacks. </description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20080101_HackingBarcodes.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Tue, 1 Jan 2008 17:47:00 GMT</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>

         <title>Commercial Keyloggers</title>

         <description>Commercial keyloggers are designed for use by corporate IT/Security/Audit teams and law enforcement agencies, and they're way more advanced than their malware cousins.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20071230_CommercialKeylogger.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sun, 30 Dec 2007 18:00:00 GMT</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Professional Keylogging</title>

         <description>Whether it's deployed in hardware or software formats, for as long as people rely upon password protected authentication processes, the keylogger will continue to be a reliable hacking tool.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20071222_HardwareKeyloggers.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Sat, 22 Dec 2007 18:00:00 GMT</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Little Pinkie</title>

         <description>In short (pun intended), females suggest that Australian boy racers are somewhat lacking in the trouser department.  Apparently the campaign has been a roaring success and has helped reduce speeding down under.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20071016_LittlePinkie.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Tue, 16 Oct 2007 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate>

      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Pained by Security Analogies</title>

         <description>Whenever I have to resort to using some kind of physical-world analogy to explain an Internet security principle, I can't but feel that I'm doing a disservice to the people listening.  Depending upon the audiences involved, my analogies have ranged far and wide.</description>

         <link>http://www.technicalinfo.net/blog/security/20070921_SecurityAnalogies.html</link>
         
         <author>Gunter Ollmann</author>

         <pubDate>Fri, 21 Sep 2007 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate>

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